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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Supreme Court Case No. 32447, district court case number SP-OT-04-77OD,
(hereinafter, 32447) and Supreme Court Case No. 34820, district court case number H03-279, (hereinafter, 34820) have been consolidated for appellate purposes. In 34820,
Max Cooke was convicted of second degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, and
assault, and appeals the judgment of conviction and his sentences for this offense. In
32447, Mr. Cooke filed a post-conviction action arising from his judgment of conviction
in 34820.
Mr. Cooke was convicted by jury verdict of second degree kidnapping,
aggravated battery, and assault. He received a unified sentence of 25 years, with 12
years fixed, for his conviction of second degree kidnapping; a sentence of 15 years, with
7 years fixed, for his conviction of aggravated battery; and a sentence of 90 days, with
credit for 90 days sewed, for his conviction of assault.
Mr. Cooke filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to timely file a
notice of appeal in his case.

He further asserted that newly discovered evidence

regarding Alison ~ooke's'competence as a witness should have been discovered by
his trial counsel and used during cross-examination, and that this newly discovered

Alison Cooke is the alleged victim in this case. This Court may wish to note that
Ms. Cooke appears to have gone by the name Alison Archuleta as of the date of
Mr. Cooke's post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (9126107 Tr., p.32, L.23 p.33, L.5.)
However, because she is referred to as Alison Cooke throughout the remaining
proceedings in this case, for ease of reference, she will be referred to as Ms. Cooke in
this brief.

-

evidence on its own justified the vacation of Mr. Cooke's conviction and sentence in the
interests of justice.
The district court originally summarily dismissed Mr. Cooke's post-conviction
petition. On appeal, the State asked the Supreme Court to remand the case to the
district court for a hearing and the Supreme Court granted the State's motion to remand
the case. Upon remand, the district court found that Mr. Cooke had timely requested
that his trial counsel file a notice of appeal, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for
not doing so. Therefore, the district court vacated its prior judgment of conviction and
re-entered an amended judgment of conviction so that Mr. Cooke could file his appeal.
However, the district court found that Mr. Cooke had not established ineffective
assistance of counsel, or that he was entitled to a new trial based on the evidence and
arguments presented regarding Ms. Cooke's competence.
On appeal in 34820, Mr. Cooke asserts that the district court at trial abused its
discretion when it permitted the State to introduce evidence of Mr. Cooke's prior bad
acts in the form of alleged threats made by Mr. Cooke over a period of several months
prior to the actions resulting in the charges at issue in this appeal. As a component of
this claim, Mr. Cooke asserts that the district court lacked the necessary factual basis to
conduct a proper balancing of whether the potential for prejudice of these statements
substantially outweighed their probative value.

Mr. Cooke also asserts that the

prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing this evidence during closing arguments as
proof of Mr. Cooke's bad character and propensity to commit crimes. Finally, he agrees
that the cumulative effect of the erroneous admission of this evidence, and the
prosecutor's improper arguments regarding this evidence, deprived him of a fair trial.

In 32447, Mr. Cooke asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that
Mr. Cooke did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and was not entitled to a
new trial, based on information regarding Ms. Cooke's competency as a witness.
Specifically, he contends that the district court misapprehended the relevant standard
for competence and made factual findings not supported by substantial evidence when
the court found that Ms. Cooke was competent to testify at trial and that Mr. Cooke had
not received ineffective assistance of counsel.
In response, the State asserts that the district court had adequate information to
make its determination regarding the admissibility of the prior bad acts evidence in this
case, and that the district court correctly found the prior threats to be admissible.
Regarding the claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the State responds that Mr. Cooke
"has failed to cite to any authority for the proposition that it is misconduct for a
prosecutor to refer to evidence that has been admitted at trial, and therefore has failed
to properly present this issue for review." (Respondent's Brief, p.18.) In addition, the
State asserts that Mr. Cooke has failed to establish that any misconduct in this case
rose to the level of a fundamental error.
The State further asserts that Mr. Cooke's allegations of error involving his postconviction claims on Ms. Cooke's competence as a witness lack merit because the
medical evidence did not state that Ms. Cooke would be permanently susceptible to
false memories, nor did the medical evidence express an opinion on whether
Ms. Cooke would be competent in the future.

Regarding Mr. Cooke's ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, the State asserts that the decisions of trial counsel
regarding cross-examination of witnesses are always deemed tactical and, therefore,

cannot be "second-guessed" by this Court and that, in any case, the cross-examination
of Ms. Cooke at trial made by trial counsel was sufficient to explore the issue of her
competence.
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify factual errors in the Appellant's Brief and
Respondent's Brief; and the further clarify the nature of the allegations being raised on
appeal and the legal standards attendant to these issues.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
As an initial matter, Mr. Cooke wishes to clarify a misstatement of the record in
this case that is contained in his Appellant's Brief. The Appellant's Brief indicates that
the district court failed to give a limiting instruction regarding the appropriate
consideration of testimony of witnesses at trial regarding prior threats and bad acts that
Mr. Cooke was alleged to have made. (Appellant's Brief, pp.26-27.) The State correctly
notes in its Respondent's Brief that the district court included a limiting instruction
regarding the permissible use of this evidence in its jury instructions. (Respondent's
Brief, p.19; 34820 R., p.44.) Upon further review of the record, it is clear that this
instruction was provided to the jury during trial at the close of testimony on June 11,
2003. (34820 Tr., p.302, 1.18 - p.303, L.4.) As such, Mr. Cooke's prior assertion that
the district court failed to give a limiting instruction is in error.
Additionally, Mr. Cooke wishes to clarify that a portion of the statement of facts
related in the Respondent's Brief were affirmatively rejected by the jury's verdict in this
case. The Respondent's Brief asserts that Mr. Cooke attempted to rape, and then
"abandoned his apparent plan to rape," Ms. Cooke.

(Respondent's Brief, p.2.)

However, as was noted in the Appellant's Brief, the jury rendered a verdict that clearly

deemed these facts not to be established. (Appellant's Brief, pp.23, 37.) The jury
determined that Mr. Cooke was not guilty of first degree kidnapping and not guilty of
assault with intent to commit rape. (30187 R., pp.39-40.) They were further instructed
that the sole fact that would elevate the charge of second degree kidnapping, which the
jury deemed to have been established, from first degree kidnapping was the
aggravating facts of either the intent to commit rape or the intent to commit serious
bodily injury upon Ms. Cooke. (34820 R., pp.47, 50.) The jury's verdicts reflect the fact
that it considered and rejected, in two separate determinations, the allegation that
Mr. Cooke had attempted to rape Ms. Cooke. See State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70, 74, 122
P.3d 1170, 1174 (Ct. App. 2005).
The remaining statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Cooke's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1.

Are Mr. Cooke's contentions regarding the district court's abuse of discretion in
admitting prior bad acts evidence supported by both argument and legal
authority?

2.

Does the State's response to Mr. Cooke's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
misapprehend the nature of the assertion of error being raised, and has
Mr. Cooke shown that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of a fundamental
error?

3.

Does the State misapprehend the nature of Mr. Cooke's allegations made during
his post-conviction proceedings regarding Ms. Cooke's lack%f competence as a
witness due to her susceptibility to false memory prior to trial, and regarding his
trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and take appropriate action
regarding the issue of her lack of competence?

ARGUMENTS

Mr. Cooke's Contentions Regardinq The District Court's Abuse Of Discretion In
Admittinq Prior Bad Acts Evidence Are Supported Bv Both Arqument And Leaal
Authority
A.

Introduction
Mr. Cooke has asserted on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in

permitting the State to introduce prior bad acts evidence in the form of prior statements
and threats that Mr. Cooke was alleged to have made even though the prejudicial effect
of these statements substantially outweighed their probative value if any.

As a

component of his abuse of discretion claim, he further asserts that the district court
could not properly weigh either the probative value of this evidence or its potential for
prejudice because the district court lacked necessary information regarding the
substance, timing, and volume of the past threats that the State was seeking to
introduce.
The State asserts that there is not a legal or factual basis for Mr. Cooke's
assertion in this case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-14.) However, the legal standards
governing prior bad act evidence, the statements of the district court, and the
application of the law to the facts of this case support Mr. Cooke's contention that the
district court abused its discretion in admitting these statements.

B.

Mr. Cooke's Contentions Resarding The District Court's Abuse Of Discretion In
Admittins Prior Bad Acts Evidence Are Supported By Both Argument And Leaal
Authority
Mr. Cooke's assertions regarding the district court's abuse of discretion in

admitting the prior bad acts evidence in this case is supported both by legal authority
and argument. Moreover, the district court's own concessions regarding its lack of
information belies the State's assertion that the court possessed sufficient information to
make an informed decision regarding the admissibility of this evidence in light of the
applicable legal standards.
As was noted in the Appellant's Brief, it is well established that a district court, in
considering whether to admit prior bad acts evidence under I.R.E. 404(b), must consider
whether the probative value of the evidence that the State seeks to have admitted at
trial is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, potential to mislead the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
See State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 254, 899 P.2d 959, 964 (1995).
Courts have also recognized that, "the government cannot be permitted to 'flood
the courtroom' with other-crimes evidence on the excuse that the crime was one of
specific intent." See State v. Draiman, 784 F.2d 248, 254 (7thCir. 1986). Other courts
have similarly noted that reversal of a defendant's conviction may be appropriate "where
the sheer volume and presentation of otherwise admissible [Rule 404(b)] evidence was
error." See White v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 470, 477 (Ky. 2005); see also U.S. v.
Long, 328 F.3d 655, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2003); State v. Hughes, 938 P.2d 457, 466 Ariz.
1997) (finding an abuse of discretion in admitting prior bad acts evidence where the
case was "saturated with improper references to defendant's bad character" and

prosecutor in closing recounted every allegation of prior bad acts as well as
"descriptions of defendant's threatening personality"). Because it is a case-specific
determination as to whether the volume of Rule 404(b) evidence will result in undue
prejudice, the gate-keeping function regarding these issues rests with the district court.
See Long, 328 F.3d at 664. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting a
large volume of such prior bad acts evidence where the court individually reviews each
piece of evidence that the State seeks to admit and evaluates the probative value and
potential for prejudice of that evidence on a piece-by-piece basis and taking the
evidence together as a whole.

Id.

Here, no such individualized evaluation ever

occurred. (34820 Tr., p.6, L.4 - p.15, L.25.)
In addition, the gate-keeping function of the district court in considering whether
to admit prior bad acts evidence includes an examination of the timing of the prior bad
acts in order to determine whether any relevance has been aqenuated through the
passage of time. See Sfate v. Ellsworth, 709 A.2d 768, 772 (N.H. 1998); Appellant's
Brief, p.21.
With these legal standards in mind, the district court itself noted that it lacked the
essential information to make an adequate legal determination regarding whether the
probative value of the evidence the State sought to admit was substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, potential to mislead the jury, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. As was noted in the Appellant's Brief,
the district court admitted as much on the record in this case. (Appellant's Brief, p.20.)
The district court stated:
Clearly, any threats made to Alison Cooke are relevant, and I believe their
probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect in this case. So, those

statements made over a period of time - you have indicated somewhere
three to six months prior to this. Again, I don't know how many this
involves, but, certainly, threats that he made to her that he was going to
kill her or himself, or both, are relevant. And I can't find that the prejudicial
effect outweighs the probative value.
(34820 Tr., p.12, L.23 - p.13, L.8 (emphasis added).)
The district court had no knowledge of the volume of the material that the State
was seeking admission of, nor did it have a clear idea of the timing of these statements.
In light of this, the district court was without necessary information to make an informed
legal determination regarding the scope and extent of admissibility of these prior bad
acts.

Therefore, Mr. Cooke's arguments regarding the district court's abuse of

discretion in admitting the prior bad acts evidence in this case are supported both
legally and factually. The State's assertion to the contrary is in error.
II.

The State's Response To Mr. Cooke's Alleqations Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
Misapprehends The Nature Of The Assertion Of Error Beina Raised
A.

Introduction
The State, in its Respondent's Brief, characterizes Mr. Cooke's allegation of

prosecutorial misconduct as proposing that, "it is misconduct for a prosecutor to refer to
evidence that has been admitted at trial," and further asserts that Mr. Cooke has failed
to cite any authority for that proposition.

(Respondent's Brief, p.18.)

This

characterization fails to grasp the claim that Mr. Cooke is actually making. Mr. Cooke's
actual assertion is that it was misconduct for the prosecutor, in closing remarks, to urge
the jury to apply evidence of Mr. Cooke's prior bad acts, that were admitted for the
limited purpose of showing intent, for the impermissible purpose of showing propensity

and further committed misconduct by urging the jury to seek to punish Mr. Cooke for
several prior uncharged allegations of misconduct. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-27.)

B.

The State's Response To Mr. Cooke's Allenations Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
Misapprehends The Nature Of The Assertion Of Error Being Raised
As previously noted, The State characterizes Mr. Cooke's assertion of

prosecutorial misconduct as proposing that, "it is misconduct for a prosecutor to refer to
evidence that has been admitted at trial," and further asserts that Mr. Cooke has failed
to cite any authority for that proposition.

(Respondent's Brief, p.18.)

This is a

misapprehension of Mr. Cooke's claim.
What Mr. Cooke has actually asserted in his Appellant's Brief is that the
prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing that evidence, admitted for a limited
purpose, should be considered by the jury for purposes for which such evidence cannot
be lawfully considered. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.) More specifically, the prosecutor
in this case argued evidence of Mr. Cooke's prior threats and uncharged allegations of
prior domestic violence were proof of Mr. Cooke's violent propensities, and the need to
punish him for these prior and uncharged harms that the State alleged he inflicted on
his wife. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.)
Mr. Cooke acknowledges the considerable latitude afforded to both parties in
arguing reasonable inferences from the evidence at trial. See, e.g., State v. Wolfrum,
145 ldaho 44, 49, 175 P.3d 206, 21 1 (Ct. App. 2007). However, "while the prosecutor
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935). Accordingly, a prosecutor should not be permitted to make closing

arguments that encourage the jury to apply evidence in a manner that is inconsistent
with the law, the rules of evidence, or with the rulings of the district court.*
The very existence of and purpose of limiting instructions regarding evidence
admitted for a limited purpose is to clarify that there are some purposes for which this
evidence should not be used. See, e.g., I.R.E. 105; Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.554,
561 (1967); State v. Greene, 512 A.2d 330, 333, n.2 (Me. 1986); State v. Guzek, 86
P.3d 1106, 1121, n.18 (Or. 2004) (overruled on other grounds by Oregon v. Guzek, 546

U.S.517 (2006)). Moreover, the purpose of closing arguments is to "sharpen and clarify
the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case," and to enlighten the jury
as to how to interpret the evidence. State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583,
587 (Ct. App. 2007). It stands to reason, then, that argument by a prosecutor that
encourages the jury to disregard the limitations placed on the admissibility of evidence
and to consider the evidence for an improper purpose cannot stand as proper closing
argument.
In this case, the prosecutor committed misconduct by encouraging the jury to
consider the evidence of Mr. Cooke's prior bad acts as evidence of his violent
propensities and further encouraged the jury to consider uncharged past harms alleged
to have been done to Ms. Cooke when considering Mr. Cooke's guilt on the charged
offenses.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.) While the prosecutor may generally make

argument regarding admissible evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, this
latitude does not permit a prosecutor to encourage the jury to apply the evidence in a

See Stafe v. Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507-508, 988 P.2d 1170, 1181-1182 (1999)
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manner contrary to the law or to a ruling of the district court regarding admissibility of
that evidence.

The State Misapprehends The Nature Of Mr. Cooke's Alleaations, Made Durins His
Post-Conviction Proceedings. Reqardinq Ms. Cooke's Lack Of Competence As A
Witness Due To Her Susceptibilitv To False Memorv Prior To Trial; And Reqardins His
Trial Counsel's Ineffectiveness For Failina To Investigate And Take Ap~ropriateAction
Regardins The Issue Of Her Lack Of Competence

A.

Introduction
In it's Respondent's Brief, the State asserts that Mr. Cooke's claims regarding

Ms. Cooke's lack of competence are not well taken because the medical evidence
presented did not indicate that Ms. Cooke's susceptability to false memory persisted
through her testimony at trial and, therefore, there was no evidence that she was
incompetent as a witness at trial. (Respondent's Brief, p.26.) The State further asserts
that Mr. Cooke has not demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
pursue issues related to Ms. Cooke's competence as a witness because Mr. Cooke
didn't establish that Ms. Cooke was incompetent, and because "counsel's crossexamination strategy is a tactical decision that will not be second-guessed."
(Respondent's Brief, p.27.)
The State's arguments misapprehend the nature of the basis for Mr. Cooke's
claim that Ms. Cooke was not competent to testify.

It is irrelevant as to whether

Ms. Cooke's condition of being susceptible to false memory would have been reduced
or eliminated over time if, during the period where she was at high risk to develop false
memory, she received information from others regarding the substance of her testimony

at trial and her memory was altered as a result. In such cases, the witness is no longer
competent to testify because the witness lacks the ability to meaningfully discern what is
the product of his or her independent recall and what is an artifact of the information that
he or she received.
Moreover, the record in this case demonstrates that Ms. Cooke was provided
with information from outside sources that could have altered her memory and rendered
her perceived recall unreliable. And there is at least one documented instance in this
record where she stated as much.
Finally, the State's assertion that the failure to adequately investigate or crossexamine witnesses is never second guessed is not an accurate statement of the law.
While decisions regarding cross-examination are normally within the purview of
strategic or tactical decisions, there is no legitimate basis to explain the failure of trial
counsel to investigate or cross-examine Ms. Cooke regarding her susceptibility to false
memory.

Since such cross-examination would go to the reliability of matters that

Ms. Cooke testified she did remember, such cross-examination would cast additional
doubt on her testimony at trial.
B.

The State Misapprehends The Nature Of Mr. Cooke's Allegations Made During
His Post-Conviction Proceedinas Reaardina Ms. Cooke's Lack Of Competence
As A Witness Due To Her Susceptibilitv To False Memow Prior To Trial: And
Regardinq His Trial Counsel's Ineffectiveness For Failina To lnvestiaate And
Take Appropriate Action Reclarding The Issue Of Her Lack Of Competence
In his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Mr. Cooke asserted that the

evidence he presented in support of his petition demonstrated that Ms. Cooke was not a
competent witness to testify at his trial because she was at risk for false memories.
(R., p.49.) He also alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate

the issue of Ms. Cooke's potential lack of competence through calling her physician as a
witness and by failing to cross-examine Ms. Cooke on the issue of false memory.
(32447 R., p.50.)
Attached to this petition was a medical report from Dr. Clay Ward, who treated
Ms. Cooke for her injuries after the crash, that contained the following conclusions
regarding Ms. Cooke's condition:
I do not believe that the patient is competent or even appropriate for a
police or forensic evaluation at this time. She does not have any recall of
events leading up to the accident and is still very much in posttraumatic
amnesia. My impression is that her information will likely be misleading,
unreliable, and she is at risk for developing new memories or false
memories rather than accurately recalling what happened prior fo the
impact.

(32447 R., p.60.)
That Ms. Cooke's condition of being at risk for developing false memory may
have changed over time is of no accord if, at the time she was at risk, her memory was
altered as a result information she had received from outside sources that she then
conflated as her own memory. As was noted by the concurrence in State v. Giles, 115
Idaho 984, 772 P.2d 191 (1989):
Even adults' memory can be tainted to the point that their actual testimony
is deemed too unreliable to be admitted without offending due process.
Examples include the tainted identification resulting from an unduly
suggestive lineup or the effect of hypnosis ... Once this tainting of memory
has occurred, the problem is irremediable. That memory is, from then on,
as real to the child as any other. This "confabulation" is precisely the
problem with hypnotically enhanced memory discussed by this Court in
lwakiri

Id. at 990-91, 772 P.2d at 197-98 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
As such, the State's argument that Ms. Cooke may not have been as susceptible
to false memory at the time she testified is irrelevant. The central consideration

regarding her competence as a witness is whether she had received false memories
during the time when she was susceptible. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.30-34.) The
district court failed to consider this critical issue, and the record in this case supports the
conclusion that Ms. Cooke's memory had been modified by information she had
received from outside sources during the period of time that she was at risk for
developing false memories.
At one point during Mr. Cooke's hearing on his post-conviction petition, during
questioning from Mr. Cooke's counsel, Ms. Cooke admitted that she had no recollection
of the ditch that she and Mr. Cooke went over in his truck. (9/26107 Tr., p.63, Ls.19-21.)
But she then testified that she did form a recollection of the ditch "from looking at the
accident scene afterwards." (9126107 Tr., p.63, L.22 - p.64, L.2.) This statement is a
clear indication that Ms. Cooke had gaps in her memory that had been filled, prior to
trial, by subsequent information that was received from an outside source.
Moreover, Ms. Cooke was surrounded by friends and family members for the
entire time of her hospitalization, and appears to have asked questions regarding what
had happened to her. (34820 Tr., p.76, L.1

- p.78, L.5, p.128, Ls.1-14.)

Ms. Cooke

also testified at trial that, after she woke up and her family was around her, she started
to "find out where [she] hurt and what was the matter with [her]," and that when she
woke up she was unaware of the origin of one of her injuries, and that her knowledge
was "[jlust what people have told [her]." (34820 Tr., p.351, Ls.2-10, p.354, Ls.5-ID.) All
of this information from the record, when coupled with the medical evidence in this case,
demonstrates that Ms. Cooke's recall was likely tainted with information that was

suggested to her by outside sources, rather than being the product of her own
perceptions.
Additionally, the State misstates case law regarding claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel that are based on the allegation of inadequate investigation
andlor cross-examination. In it's Respondent's Brief, the State asserts that "counsel's
cross-examination strategy is a tactical decision that will not be second-guessed."
(Respondent's Brief, p.27.)

However, the cases relied on by the State for this

proposition do not stand for so broad and unrestricted a holding. Upon review of these
cases, what they actually hold is that such decisions will be deemed tactical unless that
decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of review. State v. Payne, -I d a h o ,

-P.3d -,

2008 WL 2447447, * I 0 (2008) (decision of what witnesses to call is an

area that Court will not second guess without evidence of inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation);
State v. Osborne, 130 ldaho 365, 372-373, 941 P.2d 337, 344-345 (Ct. App. 1997). In
this case, Mr. Cooke's assertions regarding his trial counsel's failure to seek to have
Ms. Cooke deemed incompetent as a witness or to cross-examine her regarding the
issue of false memory are very clearly linked to Mr. Cooke's assertion of inadequate
preparation by trial counsel. As such, they can properly be examined by this Court.
Finally, the State's assertion that trial counsel did cross-examine Ms. Cooke
regarding her "ability to remember details" and the holes in her memory does not
address the core concerns that are implicated by false memory. As noted by Mr. Cooke
in his Appellant's Brief, while trial counsel cross-examined Ms. Cooke regarding various

holes in her memory, the medical report indicating that she was at high risk to develop
new or false memories would have addressed an additional issue: the reliability of those
facts Ms. Cooke testified that she did recall.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Cooke respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and sentence and remand his case for a new trial. Alternatively, he asks that this Court
vacate the district court's order denying him post-conviction relief.
DATED this 12'h day of December, 2008.
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